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Abstract
A good definition of process tracing should highlight what is distinctive about
process tracing as a methodology of causal inference. I look at eight criteria
that are used to define process tracing in the methodological literature, and
I dismiss all eight criteria as unhelpful (some because they are too restrictive,
and others because they are vacuous). In place of these criteria, I propose
four alternative criteria, and I draw a distinction between process tracing for
the ultimate aim of testing a start–end hypothesis versus process tracing as
an ultimate end in itself. Although it is clear enough how the former method
works, there is still much methodological work to be done in understanding
the latter method as a distinctive method of causal inference, I argue.
1 Introduction
Process tracing is a tool that political scientists use to hunt the causes of politi-
cal phenomena. Indeed “process tracing is perhaps the tool of causal inference
that first comes to mind when one thinks of qualitative methodology in political
science” (Mahoney 2010, 123). It “represents the empirical core of many, if not
most, case studies” (Rohlfing 2012, 150). Exemplars include classic works such
as Skocpol (1979) on the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, Tannenwald
(1999) on the taboo against using nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and
Wood (2003) on the civil war in El Salvador, amongst many other lauded stud-
ies of elections, government policy-making, international relations, and the like.
*Thank you Jeroen van Bouwel, Harold Kincaid, and one anonymous referees for your con-
structive comments on the manuscript. And thanks to an audience at the University of Kent for
discussion of these ideas. This work has received funding from the European Research Council
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What’s more, it’s claimed that process tracing can measure actual causal effects, in
contrast to quantitative methods that supposedly can only measure probabilistic
“averages” of these causal effects (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Crasnow 2012). So
it is no surprise that political methodologists have started to pay process tracing a
lot of attention.
This chapter seeks a precise definition of process tracing. The main reason to
seek such a definition goes back to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), the man-
ifesto which sparked one of the central methodological debates within political
science: what are the aims, limits and logic of the methods of political science?
in particular, how do quantitative methods differ from qualitative methods in this
regard? As methodologists have come to see process tracing as one of the central
methods in the qualitative toolkit, much of this “post-KKV” debate has begun to
focus on process tracing.
As I see it, a methodologically useful definition of process tracing should start
with some exemplars of process tracing in the political science literature, and it
should work out what most of these exemplars have in common, epistemically
speaking. What is the common rationale that warrants the conclusions that each
process tracing study draws? What epistemic problems and epistemic benefits
does this rationale give rise to? How is this rationale distinct from the rationale
that lies behind other studies that draw causal conclusions, quantitative studies
in particular? If you define process tracing too broadly, thus grouping together
studies that have different epistemic problems and epistemic benefits, then you
risk mis-identifying those problems and benefits. If you define process tracing too
narrowly, then youmiss an opportunity to understand the epistemic problems and
benefits of those studies that you’ve excluded from your definition.
Finding a useful definition will also help alleviate the concern that process
tracing is an “ad hoc” method (Gerring 2006, 178), one that is “carried out infor-
mally and without a high level of transparency” and that “lacks systematization
of technique and explicitness in execution” (Mahoney 2015, 201). As Beach and
Pedersen (2016, 302) put it: “process-tracing has become a buzzword in recent
years, but until recently there has been little agreement about what we actually
are tracing or how to conduct this tracing properly”.1
Here’s how I will proceed. My proposed definition of process tracing contains
four criteria. As I explain in Section 2, everyone agrees that
(Criterion One) For a study to count as process tracing, it must identify the
presence or absence of intermediate causal links between some factor and an
outcome of interest.
1See Bennett and Checkel (2015) and Checkel (2013) for agreement.
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In this sense, process tracing is the search for a chain of causes that led to an
outcome of interest. Section 2 then explains how some methodologists place a
further limit on what counts as process tracing:
(Criterion Two) For a study to count as process tracing, it must describe
each of these intermediate links in terms of entities engaging in regular, well-
understood activities.
Section 3 then examines the idea that, although process tracing identifies in-
termediate links in a causal chain, this is not the ultimate aim of a process tracing
study; instead it is merely a means of pursuing the following ultimate aim:
(Criterion Three — Version A) For a study to count as process tracing, its
ultimate aim must be just to test the hypothesis that the starting factor in the
chain was a cause of the final outcome. Indeed, it must pursue this ultimate
aim via a particular argumentative structure, one that I try to describe in
Section 3.
Section 4 contrasts this view of the ultimate aim of process tracing with an
alternative:
(Criterion Three — Version B) For a study to count as process tracing, its
ultimate aimmust be the identification / description of the intermediate links
in a causal chain.
That is to say, the description of these intermediate links is not a means to
some further end, such as testing the hypothesis that first factor in the chain was
a cause of the final factor. In Section 4, I show that whether a process tracing
study is a success or as a failure can depend on whether version A or version B
of Criterion Three is the correct view of the ultimate aim of the process tracing
study in question.
Section 5 then examines the suggestion that what distinguishes process tracing
from quantitative methods is in part the fact that quantitative methods use “rect-
angular” data-sets. I argue that the use of rectangular data-sets is a superficial
symptom of a more fundamental difference between process tracing and quanti-
tative methods. Namely:
(Criterion Four) A study does not count as a process tracing study if it re-
quires (Version A) any of the start–end causal relationships it measures, or
(Version B) any of the intermediate causal relationships it measures, to be
“unit homogeneous” across a largish population of cases.
In addition to criteria such as these, some methodologists explicitly offer (or
implicitly hint at) the following limits on what counts as process tracing:
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(F1) A study does not count as a process tracing study if it relies on numerical
data;
(F2) A study does not count as a process tracing study if it relies on evidence
from cases other than the single case under examination;
(F3) A study does not count as a process tracing study if it needs the proba-
bility distribution of some variable to take a particular form;
(F4) A study does not count as a process tracing study if it uses statistical
methods;
(F5) A study does not count as a process tracing study if its results can be
generalised.
Section 6will argue that these suggested criteria F1–F5 are incorrect: the limits
they place on what counts as process tracing are unhelpfully restrictive. Section 7
then examines another three putative criteria:
(E1) For a study to count as process tracing, it must only use causal process
observations, that is, diagnostic evidence to uncover the mechanism under
examination;
(E2) For a study to count as process tracing, it must only use patternmatching;
(E3) Process tracing can use a very wide variety of evidence.
I argue that criteria E1–E3 are empty: they do not place any substantive limits
on what counts as process tracing. So we are left with Criterion One Two Three
and Four as the primary ways of defining process tracing.
This raises a problem for process tracing version B—process tracing as an end
in itself. This is because standard techniques of causal inference, such as regres-
sion, require unit homogeneity (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 91–94). So
Criterion Four Version B rules out using standard causal inference techniques to
study these intermediate causal relationships. So it is currently unclear how pro-
cess tracing version B proposes to establish these intermediate causal links. To
repeat, criteria E1–E3 are empty: they do not describe how process tracing estab-
lishes intermediate causal links. (In contrast, process tracing for the ultimate aim
of testing start–end hypotheses can appeal to any techniques it likes to establish
intermediate causal links, including standard quantitative techniques.) Therefore
I offer my four criteria as a helpful starting point from which one might build an
account of process tracing version B, process tracing as an end it itself. If I am
right, the methodological literature has only begun to answer the question: how
do process tracers trace these intermediate links in causal chains?
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2 Process Tracing as Identifying Intermediate Links
The first defining feature of process tracing, everyone agrees, is that process trac-
ers search for (and try to make explicit) the mechanism that helped produce a
given outcome in a given case or cases. What, for example, was the mechanism
that prevented the Soviet Union from sending the Red Army to crush the pro-
democracy movements in Poland and East Germany in 1989? What was the
mechanism that caused El Salvadorian elites to compromise with the insurgents
at the end of the civil war in 1992? What was the mechanism whereby new Euro-
pean Union states were integrated such that they came to share the norms of the
other member states?
Of course, methodologists disagree about what it means to describe the mech-
anism that caused a given outcome (Hedstrom andYlikoski 2010). Amongmethod-
ologists interested in process tracing, however, there is at least agreement on one
point. Namely, to describe a mechanism one must at very least describe a chain
of causes that ends in the outcome in question: A caused B, B caused C, C caused
D, and D caused E.2 For example, Wood describes the following causal chain: (A)
insurgents in El Salvador took over plantations in the 1980s. This caused (B) the
El Salvadorian economy to rely less on primary commodities. This caused (C) the
El Salvadorian elite’s preferences to become more democratic. This caused (D)
the elite and the insurgents to begin to bargain. And this caused (E) a transition
towards democracy. Thus process tracing searches for the chain of causes that
led, in the case under examination, to the outcome one is interested in:
(Criterion One) For a study to count as process tracing, it must identify the
presence or absence of intermediate causal links between some factor A and
an outcome of interest E.
To this requirement, some methodologists would add that to describe a mech-
anism, one must also describe this causal chain in such a way that each link in
the chain is described as an “entity” engaging in a regular and well-understood
“activity”. For example, the most profitable way for capital owners to produce
primary commodities is to repress their workers, one might think; but to produce
other commodities and services repression is less effective. If true, this fact helps
one understand the causal link between B (the shift away from primary commodi-
ties) and C (elite preferences for democracy). This link arises, one might argue,
because this new economic structure B constrained the opportunities available
to capital owners; they are no longer able to make a profit by repressing their
workers. And the idea of an economic structure constraining or expanding an
2See Gerring (2006) and Checkel (2008) and indeed most of the citations in his chapter.
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individual’s opportunities is a well-understood activity. What’s more, all or most
individuals adhere to the norms of belief–desire psychology, one might think, and
so this activity that operates across individuals in a more or less regular fashion.
Therefore, to describe the link between B and C in these terms is to describe it
as an entity engaged in a regular and well-understood activity. And this is re-
quired if one wants to truly be describing the mechanisms that links A with E, say
many methodologists.3 Thus some methodologists would add to our definition of
process tracing:
(Criterion Two) For a study to count as process tracing, it must describe
each of these intermediate links in terms of entities engaging in regular, well-
understood activities.
Some theorists would elaborate on this point and say that, in political science,
the best understood and most regular activities are those in which goal-orientated
agents make decisions in light of the opportunities available to them.4 For ex-
ample, an individual member of the elite decides to bargain with the insurgents
because that is the best way for this individual to maximize the return on the cap-
ital she owns. Or at least, one might say, the best understood (macro) activities
are those activities for which one knows how the activity in question arises out of
goal-orientated agents interacting with each other. Take for example a drought
making it more difficult for farmers to grow coffee and thus causing a rise in its
price. This is an entity of sorts (a drought) engaging in an activity (driving up
the price of coffee). Standard micro-economic theory makes some assumptions
about how consumers and firms interact with each other in market contexts, and
about consumers’ preferences for coffee and tea and other goods; and from these
assumptions it deductively proves that the price of coffee will rise. And, insofar
as this story is more or less true, then, this activity is well-understood, one might
think. (A comparison: a bunsen burner increases the pressure of a gas in a sealed
container. One might think that this activity is only well-understood once one
knows how this activity arises from the fact that a gas is just billions of individual
particles moving in accordance with Newton’s laws of motion.)
So we have one uncontroversial criterion (Criterion One) and one somewhat
more controversial criterion (Criterion Two) for what counts as process tracing.
At very least, process-tracing looks for the presence or absence of intermediate
causal links between some factor A and an outcome of interest E.
3Citations to e.g. Beach and Pedersen (2016) who agree, and those who disagree.
4This suggest seems to be strongly implied in Evangelista (2015)Waldner (2012) Bennett (2008)
and George and Mckeown (1985).
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3 The Logic of Testing Start–End Hypotheses
Methodologists use lots of suggestive metaphors to describe what process tracers
do. Process tracers “break down” or “dis-aggregate” causes (Gerring 2006). They
trace causes “forward” and “backward” in time (Bennett 2010). Their method
“focuses” on the “intervening steps” in a causal chain (Bennett 2010). But it is
surprisingly rare for methodologists to make precise the specific logic behind pro-
cess tracing. And this is notwithstanding the fact that process tracers often point
to Bayesianism as the general epistemological framework within which process
tracing is to be understood (more on this point in due course).
However, at times, some methodologists seem to suggest the following as the
specific logic behind process tracing:
(Criterion Three — Preliminary Version) For a study to count as process
tracing, it must ultimately aim to support the hypothesis that the starting
factor in the chain A was a cause of the final outcome E. And the means
by which it pursues this ultimate aim must be the following argumentative
structure.
Premises: A caused B. B caused C. C caused D. D caused E.
Conclusion: A caused E
This criterion views process tracing as the study of intermediate causal links
in order to support a start–end hypothesis, in this case the hypothesis that A caused
E. Waldner (2012) is the most explicit in identifying the logical structure of this
reasoning, which he calls the logic of “concatenation”.
To claim the existence of a causal chain is to claim that given entities and
mechanisms, one event constrained future events such that a subsequent
event was bound to happen, or at least that an earlier event substantially
shifted the probability distribution governing the subsequent event, making
sequelae far more probable. … Process tracing accounts, for this reason,
tend to make deterministic causal claims that, given a set of initial and scope
conditions, an outcome was bound to occur. (Waldner 2012, 69)
Some other methodologists hint at this logical structure too:5
For example, when analysing World War I, it seems plausible to believe that
Austria’s decision to initiate war with Serbia was necessary for the general
5See for example Mahoney (1999), Mahoney (2004), Rohlfing (2012), Bennett (2010), Ma-
honey (2015), Collier (2011b), and perhaps also Humphreys and Jacobs (2015), and Gerring
(2006).
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war. In turn, Austria’s decision may have required the assassination of Fer-
dinand, such that this assassination may also have been necessary for the
general war. (Mahoney 2015, 213)
If one can theorise a full sequence of steps, one should also test for the pres-
ence of each step because otherwise parts of the argument remain untested.
In set-relational terms, this means that each step is a necessary component
and they are jointly sufficient for inferring that the purported cause indeed
is a cause. (Rohlfing 2012, 152)
Process-tracing study provides stronger evidence of the existence of a causal
process(es) linking C and O because evidence is provided for each part of the
causal process. (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 176)
In process-tracing, if we can collect confirmatory evidence of each part of a
mechanism that we can trust, we can make a relatively strong inference that
C is causally related to O through a causal mechanism. (Beach and Pedersen
2016, 273)
By tracing an explicit mechanism, we would be more justified in making the
claim thatC is linked toO through a causal mechanism. (Beach and Pedersen
2016, 83)
It’s worth noting in passing that there is disagreement amongst the methodol-
ogists quoted here as to the nature of the causes being traced here. As you can see,
some treat causes as in some sense necessary for their effects; others treat causes
as in some sense sufficient for their effects.
I will now show that at least one exemplary process tracing study fails criterion
Criterion Three, in its preliminary form given above. This study is not a study of
intermediate causal links to support a start–end hypothesis. The exemplary study
I have in mind is Brady (2010)’s analysis of the 2000 presidential election in the
United States. In this election, the national media reported at 8pm EST that the
polls in Florida had closed. But this report was false: ten counties in Florida’s
western Panhandle are in the Central time zone (CST) not the Eastern time zone
(EST). As a result, the polls in these ten counties remained open until 9pm EST.
What’s more, at 8:48pm EST the national media reported that Al Gore had won
Florida, even though polls in these ten counties were open for another 12 minutes.
In these two respects, the media’s call was premature. Did this premature media
call cause would-be voters in these ten staunchly pro-Bush counties not to vote?
Lott (2005) uses a standard quantitative technique (differences-in-differences
regression) to estimate that, if the media had not prematurely called the Florida
election, Bush’s victory over Al Gore in Florida would have been 7,500 to 37,500
votes greater than it actually was. Against this, Brady uses process tracing to dis-
pute Lott’s conclusions. Brady calculates that (F) there were 379,000 would-be
voters in the Florida panhandle. That is to say, people who intended to vote in
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the election. Since the media declared a Gore victory twelve minutes before the
close of the polls, Brady focuses his attention on late would-be voters: people who
hadn’t yet voted by the last twelve minutes of the polls being open, but who in-
tended to do so. Drawing on evidence that in 1996 Florida voters didn’t vote in
disproportionately large numbers in the last hour, and assuming that 1996 and
2000 are similar in this respect, Brady infers from (F) that (G) there were at most
4,200 would-be late voters in 2000.6 Drawing on general evidence about media
reach, Brady infers from (G) that (H) at most 840 would-be late voters heard the
media call. And drawing on evidence about the support for Bush in the Florida
panhandle, he infers from (H) that (I) at most 560 would-be late Bush-voters heard
the media call. And drawing on general evidence about voters’ responses to pre-
mature media calls, he infers from (I) that (J) at most 56 would-be Bush-voters
decided not to vote because of the media call. Even assuming that no would-be
Gore-voters decided not to vote because of the media call, it follows that (K) if the
media hadn’t called the election prematurely, Bush’s victory would at most have
been 56 votes greater. Quite a different estimate from Lott’s estimate of 7,500
to 37,500!7 This is a quick but (I think) faithful reconstruction of Brady’s process
tracing argument.8
What is the logical structure of Brady’s process tracing argument? On a first
glance, one might be tempted to say the following: F caused G, and G caused H,
and H caused I, and I caused J. So Brady’s argument is clearly a study of inter-
mediate causal links to support a start–end hypothesis, one in which the causal
chain runs F to G to H to I to J. But a second look shows that this interpretation
is incorrect.9 To see this, note that a inference to support a start–end hypothe-
sis using a causal chain running from F to J is an argument for the conclusion
that F caused J. Applied to this case, the conclusion would be: the fact that there
were 379,000 would-be voters in the panhandle caused the fact that at most 56
would-be Bush-voters decided not to vote because of the media call. But this is
6Brady provides a second argument for the figure of 4,200, an argument that is more dubi-
ous in my view. This argument simply assumes that would-be voters did not intend to vote in
disproportionately high numbers in the last hour. But the warrant for this assumption is highly
questionable.
7However, Brady is clearly focusing only on the second premature call (the 8:48pm report that
Gore had won). But Lott seems to focus on the two premature calls together (including the 8pm
report that the polls had closed).
8Brady talks about ‘voters’ rather than ‘would-be’ voters as I do. But it seems to me that for
Brady’s argument to work he needs to be talking about would-be voters. So to make Brady’s
argument sound, one needs to tinker with the figures that Brady gives. For example, I suspect that
Brady’s figure of 379,000 is a report of the number of actual votes cast rather than an estimate of
the number of would-be voters.
9Onemight also dispute that some of these links in the chain are truly causal—the link between
H and I to take just one example. But I will not explore this point further.
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not Brady’s conclusion. Brady’s conclusion is instead J itself: at most 56 would-be
Bush-voters decided not to vote because of the media call.10 And so the structure
of Brady’s argument—despite appearances—is not a study of intermediate causal
links to support a start–end hypothesis on the causal chain running from F to J.
Instead, the logic of Brady’s argument is different. Here’s how I see it. For
any would-be voter we can ask whether the following conditions hold: (1) did the
early media call A cause (B) this would-be voter to hear the media call? and (2)
did hearing the media call B cause (C) this would-be voter not to vote, rather than
voting for Bush? The evidence that Brady provides suggests that of the 379,000
would-be voters, at most 1/5 heard the media call, and so 1/5 satisfy condition
one. It also suggests that at most 1/90 intended to vote late (rather than vote early
or vote via absentee ballot) of which 2/3 intended to vote for Bush, and of which
1/10 would be put-off by an early call, so at most 1/1350 satisfy condition two.
So at most 1/6750 would-be voters satisfy both condition one and condition two.
That is to say, at most 56 people. However, one might claim that A can only cause
C via a causal chain running through B. The only way in which the media call
could influence a given voter’s behavior is through that voter actually hearing the
media call. It follows that the number of people for which A (themedia call) caused
C (that individual to refrain from voting for Bush) is at most 56 people. That’s the
logic of Brady’s argument as I see it. (Interestingly, on my reconstruction, there is
only one intermediate link in the chain being analysed, rather than three or four
as appears on a first glance. The inferential complexity instead arises because
Brady needs to piece together lots of assumptions about population frequencies—
1/90× 2/3× 1/10—in order to infer that at most 1/1350 would-be voters satisfy
condition two.)
Note that, as I’ve reconstructed it, at no point does Brady’s argument sup-
port a start–end hypothesis. Yes, it’s true that—for any individual for whom A
caused B and for whom B caused C—one might infer that A caused C. But this
extra inference is entirely dispensable to Brady’s overall argument. Instead the
key move in Brady’s argument has an altogether different structure. It’s a study
of intermediate causal links in order to undermine a start–end hypothesis:
Premise: A caused C only if A caused B, and only if B caused C.
Premise: A did not cause B (or B did not cause C ).
Conclusion: A did not cause C.
Taking stock, I’ve identified two types of argumentative structure that are the
basis of some process tracing studies: studying intermediate links to support a




I now want to clarify these two argumentative structures by responding to the
following sort of worry. Most methodologists agree that the general epistemolog-
ical framework in which process tracing should be understood is Bayesian epis-
temology (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Fairfield and Charman 2017): a causal
hypothesis is tested by the observations that one expects to make, if that hypothe-
sis is true. But my two forms of studying intermediate links don’t seem to do that.
They are presented as arguments in a premise–conclusion form, rather than as
a probability function, which is the main currency of Bayesian epistemology. It’s
therefore unclear how they fit into the Bayesian framework. That’s the concern.
(Readers unfamiliar with the Bayesian epistemological framework might con-
sult Howson and Urbach ([1989] 2006) to understand the notation and underly-
ing ideas in this section. Note that Bayesian epistemology differs from Bayesian
statistics. Bayesian epistemology is a fully general epistemological framework ca-
pable of handling hypotheses of any type, causal hypotheses for example; Bayesian
statistics is a more narrow and less philosophical. It’s a set of tools for estimating
the parameters of probability distributions.)
To address this important concern, I will now reformulate these two types of
argumentative structure to bring out what is common to both, and to show how
they fit within the Bayesian epistemological framework. To begin, let e denote
the evidence uncovered by a given study in political science. And let h denote the
start–end causal hypothesis that the study ultimately aims to test: A caused C. And
consider the following two intermediate hypotheses: hAB is the hypothesis that A
caused B; and hBC is the hypothesis that B caused C.
Now, for any given study one can ask: does the evidence e that it uncovers bear
on start–end hypothesis h only by first bearing on these intermediate hypotheses?
The intuitive idea here is that if one were to become certain of the truth or falsity of
hAB, and similarly of hBC , then ewould have no further bearing upon h. Suppose,
for example, one were to learn of a given individual that hAB the early media call
caused her to hear the early media call, and hBC hearing the early media call
did indeed cause her not to vote, rather than voting for Bush. In this case, the
evidence e′ that two thirds of the voters in the panhandle are pro-Bush becomes
irrelevant for evaluating h, the hypothesis that the media call caused this voter
not to vote (rather than voting for Bush). And the same goes for all the other
evidence e collected in Brady’s study. Put in terms of probabilities, the currency of
the Bayesian framework: P (h|hABhBC) = P (h|hABhBCe) and P (h|¬hABhBC) =
P (h|¬hABhBCe) and P (h|hAB¬hBC) = P (h|hAB¬hBCe) and P (h|¬hAB¬hBC) =
P (h|¬hAB¬hBCe).
What’s more, one can usually split the overall evidence e that a study uncovers
into two or more parts. For example, one part of Brady’s evidence was e1 his gen-
eral evidence about media listening rates; and a distinct part of Brady’s evidence
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was his evidence e2 about the support for Bush in the panhandle. Thus for each
intermediate hypothesis one can ask: is there part e′ of the overall evidence e that
bears on this intermediate hypothesis alone? In the Brady study, for example, ev-
idence e1 bore on hAB but not on hBC . That is to say, his general evidence about
media listening rates bore on the hypothesis that the early media call caused a
given individual to hear the media call; but it did not bear on the hypothesis that
a given individual hearing the media call would cause her not to vote for Bush. In
terms of probabilities: P (hAB|e1) ̸= P (hAB) but P (hBC |e1) = P (hBC). Similarly,
evidence e2 bore on hBC but not on hAB. That is to say, Brady’s evidence about the
support for Bush in the panhandle bore on the hypothesis that a given individual
hearing the media call would cause her not to vote for Bush; but it did not bear on
the hypothesis that the early media call caused given individual to hear the media
call. In terms of probabilities: P (hBC |e2) ̸= P (hBC) but P (hAB|e2) = P (hAB).
This now puts me in a position to define the method of identifying intermedi-
ate causal links for testing start-end hypotheses:
(Criterion Three—Version A) For a study to count as process tracing, it must
ultimately aim to test the hypothesis that the starting factor in the chain was a
cause of the final outcome. And the means by which it pursues this ultimate
aim must be the following logical structure.
(I) The overall evidence e bears on hypothesis h only by first bearing on
the intermediate hypotheses.
(II) For each intermediate hypothesis, there is a piece of evidence e′ that
bears on this intermediate hypothesis alone.1112
In the Brady example that I’ve just analysed, I considered the start–end hy-
pothesis h that A caused C and the intermediate hypothesis hAB that A caused B
and the intermediate hypothesis hBC that B caused C. That is to say, I consid-
ered a single causal chain with only one intermediate link. But Criterion Three
11Condition II is necessary, I suggest, because many studies that test hypothesis h but don’t
intuitively do so “via” testing hCD and hDE will nevertheless satisfy condition I, I suggest. At any
rate, for broad agreement with my suggestion here, see Beach and Pedersen (2016) and Gerring
(2006).
12Note that Criterion Three does not require that one can partition the evidence e into evidence
eAB that bears on hAB alone, and into evidence eBC that bears on hBC alone, with no evidence
left over. Take for example a scenario in which one’s evidence breaks down into three parts: eA
is evidence about the observed values of variable A, eB is evidence about the observed values of
variable B, and eC is evidence about the observed values of variable C. Imagine further that eA
and eB (but not eC ) bear on the intermediate hypothesis hAB that A caused B; while eB and eC
(but not eA) bear on the intermediate hypothesis hBC that B caused C. Therefore, eA bears on
hAB alone, and eC bears on hBC alone, and so this case satisfies Criterion Three, even though eB
bears on both hAB and on hBC . (Thank you Harold Kincaid for pointing this out to me.)
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encompasses more complicated examples. One might consider the start–end hy-
pothesis h that A caused E and the intermediate hypothesis hAB that A caused B,
and hBE that B caused E. And one might, in addition, consider the intermediate
hypothesis hAC that A caused C, and hCD that C caused D and hDE that D caused
E. In this more complicated set-up, one is examining two causal chains that might
run from A to E. The first has one intermediate link B, and the second has two
intermediate links, C and D.
I conclude that many process tracing studies conform to the logic given in
criterionCriterion Three (Version A), namely identifying intermediate causal links
for the ultimate aim of testing start–end hypotheses.
4 Identifying Intermediates as an End in Itself ?
In this section, I want to examine an alternative idea, the idea that process tracing
does not ultimately aim to test start–end hypotheses. Instead:
(Criterion Three — Version B) For a study to count as process tracing, its
ultimate aimmust be the identification / description of the intermediate links
in a causal chain.
In other words, the previous section dealt with the identification of intermedi-
ate links for the ultimate end of testing start–end hypotheses; and this section will
deal with identifying intermediate links as an ultimate aim in itself. (Of course,
there are also other aims to which one might put a process tracing study in addi-
tion to these two aims. But these two aims seem to me to be primary. For example,
the aim of making effective policy is parasitic on these two aims, I’d suggest: for
any given policy objective, to gain the knowledge required for effective policy in-
terventions is just to gain the causal knowledge of a start–end relationship or a
intermediate relationship that the policymaker can exploit.)
Why might testing one or more intermediate hypotheses be valuable for its
own sake? One answer is that, although the knowledge that A causes E provides
some understanding of why E occurred, this understanding is limited. In contrast,
if one knows that A caused E via one causal chain that runs through B, and also via
a second causal chain that runs through C andD, one has a deeper understanding
of why E occurred—especially if the links in this causal chain are described in
terms of entities engaged in well-understood activities (see section 2).
To make the distinction between these two aims more vivid, imagine a sce-
nario in which a method other than process tracing is able to establish that A
caused E, to a high degree of certainty. Imagine, for example, that instrumental
variables regression suggests that (A) the existence of institutions that guarantee
13
private property rights causes (E) long run economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson 2005). Let’s also imagine that the assumptions needed for this tech-
nique to be reliable are known to be true. In this case, this instrumental variables
regression puts us in a position to know the start-end hypothesis that private prop-
erty rights A cause growth E. Is it still worth tracing the process between A and E?
If you answer “no” then your ultimate aim is just to test the start–end hypothesis
that A caused E. But if you answer “yes” then you take the identification of the
intermediate causal links between A and E to be an ultimate end in itself.
Of course, there is no reason why one cannot adopt both of these two aims
together as the ultimate aim of a single process tracing study. Nevertheless, it
is important to analyse these aims separately, I will now argue. The reason I
think one needs to analyze these two aims separately is that testing a start–end
hypotheses (via identifying intermediate links) is often more difficult than testing
one or more intermediate hypotheses themselves. I will give three examples of
this.
Example one. Consider the hypothesis that A the rise of Nazism in the 1930s was
a cause of E the formation of the state of Israel in 1948. Suppose that one tests the
following intermediate hypotheses: (i) the rise of Nazism A caused B the genocide
of Jews in Europe in the 1940s as well as their persecution in the 1930s; (ii) B was
a cause of C Jewish refugees fleeing to Mandatory Palestine from 1933–47; and
(iii) C was a cause of E the formation of Israel. Let’s also assume the difference-
making view of causation: to say that C was a cause of E is to say that C made a
positive difference to E, which is to say that if C had not occurred, then E would
not have occurred either. Suppose that one then discovers evidence that Israel
would have been formed at any rate, even without the Jewish refugees who fled
to Palestine 1933–47. On this basis one concludes that iii is false: C was not a
cause of E. In this case, I think, this discovery has deepened one’s understanding
of why the state of Israel was formed, in that one has ruled out one of the plausible
causes of this outcome.13 However, this discovery has not done much to test the
start–end hypothesis that A was a cause of E, I suggest. After all, there are lots of
other plausible causal chains that link A to E. For example: the rise of Nazism A
caused B* the war between the British Empire and Nazi Germany, which caused
C* damage to Britain’s economy, which caused D* Britain’s inability to govern
Palestine in the 1940s, which was a cause of E the formation of Israel in 1948. In
sum, the study of intermediate links succeeds in rejecting the intermediate hypoth-
esis that C caused E—and it thereby increases our understanding of the outcome
E—but it fails to test the start–end hypothesis that A caused E. Judged by one ul-
13Philosophers often talk about understanding-why as causal knowledge. But I see no reason
why this knowledge need be knowledge of the presence of a cause, rather than knowledge of the
absence of a cause.
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timate aim it’s a somewhat successful analysis; judged by the other ultimate aim
it’s mostly unsuccessful.
Example two. Recall the World War I example from Section 3. Suppose one
fails to find evidence for or against the hypothesis that A the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand caused B Austria to start a war with Serbia. But suppose one finds
strong evidence that B Austria’s starting a war with Serbia caused E the general
war. In this case, one has almost completely failed to test the start–end hypothesis
that A the assassination of Franz Ferdinand caused E the general war. Neverthe-
less, one has increased one’s understanding of why the general war occurred: it’s
because Austria started a war with Serbia. In this case, the study of intermediate
links succeeds in establishing the intermediate hypothesis that B caused E—and
it thereby increases our understanding of the outcome E—but again it fails to test
the start–end hypothesis that A caused E. Judged by one ultimate aim it’s a some-
what successful analysis; judged by the other ultimate aim it’s mostly unsuccessful.
Example three. Repurposing an example from Hitchcock (2001), suppose that
one discovers that A high investment in the railroads in the 1890s in the United
States caused B low investment in canals and roads in the 1890s. And suppose that
one also discovers that B low investment in canals and roads caused E transport
costs to be high. This analysis succeeds in the aim of testing these intermediate
hypotheses. (And it seems to me that, by that same token, it deepens one’s under-
standing of why US transport costs are high.) However, one might think that this
analysis of intermediate links, as it stands, fails to test the start–end hypothesis that
A caused E. For example, one might think that causation is just difference mak-
ing; and onemight think that railroad investment Amade a difference to transport
costs E via a positive route and a negative route. The positive route is this: rail-
road investment A made a positive difference to D railroad efficiency, which itself
made a positive difference to E transport costs. The negative route is this: railroad
investment A made a negative difference to B canal and road investment, which
itself made a positive difference to E transport costs. Therefore, one might think,
whether A railroad investment made a positive or negative or no difference to E
transport costs will be determined by the relative strength of these positive and
negative routes. And—let’s imagine—this relative strength is something that we
have yet to examine. So the analysis of intermediate links succeeds in establishing
several intermediate hypotheses—and it thereby increases our understanding of
the outcome E—but again it doesn’t go far in testing the start–end hypothesis that
A caused E. Judged by one ultimate aim it’s a totally successful analysis; judged by
the other ultimate aim it’s mostly unsuccessful. (Of course, some people reject the
view of causation as difference making. And for some of these alternative views,
causation is transitive: if A caused B and if B caused E then it’s impossible for A
not to have also caused E.)
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On the basis of these three examples—this third example especially—I con-
clude that one can often test one or more intermediate hypotheses (and thereby
deepen one’s understanding of the final outcome) while also falling short of testing
a start–end hypothesis. It follows from this that there is no such thing as a good
or bad study of intermediate causal links. Rather there are good and bad stud-
ies relative to the ultimate aim of testing start-end hypotheses, and relative to the
ultimate aim of testing intermediate hypotheses alone. It follows from this that
we need two sets of methodological guidelines for analyzing intermediate links
in a causal chain: one for those political scientists who aim only to test a start–
end hypothesis, and another for those who aim only to test some intermediate
hypotheses. (Political scientists who pursue both aims in a single study will need
to follow both sets of guidelines. They will need to trade-off these aims against
each other if and when the guidelines conflict with each other.) For this reason,
it’s important for methodologists to draw a distinction between these two ultimate
aims for which one might study intermediate links.
Unhappily, the literature does not yet draw a sharp distinction between these
two ultimate aims.14 For example, Beach and Pedersen (2016) distinguish between
“explaining outcome” process tracing on the one hand and “theory building” and
“theory testing” process tracing on the other. But this distinction—it is crucial to
note—is nothing like my distinction between studying intermediate links as an
ultimate end in itself versus as a means that serves the ultimate aim of testing
start–end hypotheses. As far as I understand Beach and Pedersen, “explaining
outcome” process tracing means process tracing that reconstructs a very long and
detailed causal chain. As a result, this precise causal chain will be idiosyncratic
to the case in question and will not be found in other cases—even though any
individual link in the chain may be found is some other cases. So Beach and Ped-
ersen’s distinction has to do with whether a causal chain exhibits uniformity across
cases. It has nothing to do with the distinction between ultimately aiming to test
a start–end hypothesis versus ultimately aiming to test one or more intermediate
hypotheses.
Even though the literature does not sharply draw this distinction, there are
some hints as to which aim various methodologists have in mind when they talk
about process tracing. On the one hand, Section 3 has already cited methodol-
ogists who seem to endorse testing start–end hypotheses as the ultimate aim of
process tracing. On the other hand, Checkel (2013) thinks that one important
aim of process tracing is to test the hypothesis that A caused B caused E against
the rival hypothesis that A caused D caused E. This is clearly testing intermediate
14Waldner (2012) gestures towards this distinction but does not clarify it or study its implications.
Beach (2017) and Bennett and Checkel (2015) mention these two aims, but do not draw attention
to the distinction or study its implications.
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hypotheses as an ultimate end itself, not for the ultimate aim of testing the start–
end hypothesis that A caused E. Similarly, Hall (2003) states that an important
aim of process tracing is to increase the “explanatory power” of one’s theory by
establishing that A caused B caused E, so this sounds again like testing intermedi-
ate hypotheses as an end it itself (deepening understanding); see also Bennett and
Checkel (2015).
In fact, some methodologists seem to take process tracing as having both these
ultimate aims, even though they don’t highlight these aims as distinct, or explore
the implications of this distinction.15 Contrast the citations of Beach and Pedersen
in Section 3 with:
When embarking on a study of the mechanisms linking a cause and outcome,
we often already possess cross-case knowledge about patterns of difference-
making between the two factors. The reason we then trace mechanisms using
in-depth case studies is to investigate the “how actually” question, shedding
more light on whether there is evidence of a mechanism and thereby also
informing us how a cause contributes to co-produce an outcome. (Beach
and Pedersen 2016, 41, emphasis mine)
5 Rectangular Datasets and Comparability
This section will examine the suggestion that the type of evidence used in process
tracing studies differs from that used in quantitative studies: unlike process trac-
ing, quantitative studies uses “comparable” data arranged into a “rectangular”
datasets. I will argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is that
process tracing, unlike quantitative methods, does not rely on an assumption of
“unit homogeneity”.
Process tracing studies are often said to draw upon qualitative evidence, which
is to be contrasted with quantitative evidence. One obvious way of making this
idea more precise is to offer the following criterion:
(F1) A study does not count as a process tracing study if it relies on numerical
data, data of the form ‘the number of X s is . . .’ or ‘the proportion of X s that
were Y s is . . .’.
A moment’s thought shows that this criterion is too restrictive. Exemplary
instances of process tracing often rely on numerical data (Brady 2010; Gerring
2006). For example, Wood (2003) uses as evidence the percentage of farmland
15See Beach (2017) and Bennett and Checkel (2015) for further examples.
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in El Salvador that was put to various purposes, the number of people killed at
various stages of the civil war, and the proportion of town majors that resigned
during the war.
Instead of criterion F1, a more promising suggestion is that process tracing
studies handle numerical evidence differently from standard quantitative meth-
ods:
Because each [numerical] observation is quite different from the rest, they do
not collectively constitute a sample. Each observation is sampled from a dif-
ferent population. This means that each [numerical] observation is qualita-
tively different. It is thus the non-comparability of adjacent observations, not
the nature of individual observations, that differentiates the process-tracing
method from standard research designs. (Gerring 2006, 179)
What doesGerringmeanwhen he suggests that quantitative studies use datasets
in which the data is comparable? A common way of interpreting this suggestion is
as the suggestion that quantitative studies use rectangular data sets: each dataset
is constituted by a number of cases (the rows of the dataset) and by a number of
variables (the columns of the dataset) and for each case one observes the value
of each of those variables (the cells of the dataset); see Waldner (2012), Collier,
Brady, and Seawright (2010), and Rohlfing (2012) for discussion.
But this suggestion cannot be quite right. To see this, consider the phenomenon
of missing data. Quantitative studies that use many cases and many variables are
often unable to observe the values of some of the cells in the rectangular dataset,
so their dataset deviates from this rectangular ideal. But, according to the current
suggestion, the more that a study’s dataset deviates from this rectangular ideal,
the more methodologically similar that study is to process tracing studies, and the
less similar it is to standard quantitative studies. But that can’t be right, everyone
would agree: quantitative studies with missing data are most fruitfully thought of
as a sophisticated form of quantitative study, not as something that approaches a
qualitative or process tracing method. This illustrates, I suggest, that the use of
rectangular datasets by quantitative methods is, in fact, a superficial symptom of
a deeper and more interesting epistemic distinction between quantitative studies
and process tracing studies.
What might this deeper distinction be? Let’s examine the logic of quantitative
studies in more detail. Take for example a political scientist who is interested in
the extent to which natural resource wealth R and ethnic diversity D contributed
to the duration Y of the civil war in El Salvador, for example. Let ra denote
El Salvador’s actual resource wealth (2 billion dollars say) and let da denote El
Salvador’s actual ethnic diversity (10 percent say) and let ya denote the actual
duration of the civil war in El Salvador (14 years).
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Contrast this actual scenario A with a hypothetical scenario B in which El
Salvador’s resource wealth is instead rb (1 billion dollars say) although its ethnic
diversity rb is the same as ra (10 percent). Let yb denote what the duration of
the civil war in El Salvador would have been, if El Salvador had instead been in
this hypothetical scenario B. Most quantitative methodologists agree that ya − yb
denotes the causal contribution that resource wealth being ra (2 billion) rather
than rb (1 billion) made to the duration of the civil war in El Salvador. But how
to measure ya − yb?
Consider any hypothetical scenario s you like, in which resources rs are any-
thing you like, and in which diversity ds is anything you like. So ys denotes what
the duration of the civil war in El Salvador would have been, if El Salvador had
instead been in scenario s. Accordingly E(Y s) denotes the propensity of the civil
war in El Salvador to endure in this scenario s. Metaphorically speaking, if one
were to repeat history over and over again a large number of times, each time
ensuring that El Salvadorian resources were rs and diversity were ds, but allowing
other variables to vary, E(Y s) denotes the average duration of the civil war in El
Salvador, averaged across these metaphorical repeats of history.
Now, to estimate causal contribution ya − yb, quantitative political scientists
proceed by thinking about a larger population of cases—for example, all civil wars
since 1945. And they assume that in each of these cases the propensity of the civil
war in question to endure is a function of resource wealth and ethnic diversity. For
example theymight assume that, for each civil war post 1945,E(Y s) = β1rs+β2ds
is true for any hypothetical scenario s. (Here β1 and β2 are unknown coefficients
that are assumed to be the same for each scenario s and for each civil war post
1945.)
With this key assumption in place, it follows that E(Y a − Y b) = β1(ra − rb) =
β1(2− 1) = β1. This fact allows one to proceed as follows. First, one collects data
on R resource wealth, D ethnic diversity and Y civil war duration, from many
civil wars since 1945. Second, one uses standard statistical techniques to measure
the values of β1 and β2 that “fit” this dataset best, or “explain” this dataset best.
Third, since E(Y a−Y b) = β1, we can now use our estimate of β1 as an (unbiased)
estimate of ya−yb, the causal contribution that resource wealth being ra (2 billion)
rather than rb (1 million) made to the duration of the war in El Salvador. This is
the econometric approach to causal inference in a nutshell.
Note that our key assumption entails that there is a single mathematical func-
tion that describes the propensity of each civil war post 1945 to endure, for any
hypothetical scenario s; for example, the function E(Y s) = 3rs + 2ds. That is to
say, all the civil wars post 1945 exhibit “unit homogeneity”, it is assumed (King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994, 91–94). To be clear, unit homogeneity does not say
that the actual causal contribution ya−yb of an extra billion dollars is the same for
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El Salvador as it is for Northern Ireland, say. This is because the above mathe-
matical function is a description of a probabilistic average E(Y s), not of the hypo-
thetical outcome ys itself. Indeed, unit homogeneity itself does not even require
that that the average contribution E(Y a − Y b) is the same for El Salvador as it
is for Northern Ireland. To see this, note that the mathematical function that
satisfies unit homogeneity might be more complicated than the one I gave as an
example. It might be E(Y s) = (3 + ds)rs for instance—in which case, those civil
wars with greater ethnic diversity would be wars in which 1 billion extra resource
wealth makes a greater causal contribution (on average) to the war’s duration. To
be clear, unit homogeneity is simply the assumption that there is a single mathe-
matical function—and a single specification of the values of the coefficients in the
function—that describes the propensity of each civil war post 1945 to endure.
This knowledge of unit homogeneity, across some largish population of cases,
is absolutely essential to the reliability of the econometric method (King, Keo-
hane, and Verba 1994). (Of course, there is no need to assume unit homogeneity
across all cases: if the US Civil War isn’t in one’s dataset, for example, or in the
population of civil wars that one wants to study, then there is no need to assume
that the above mathematical function describes the propensity of the US Civil
War to endure.)
Taking stock, these reflections suggest another essential feature of process trac-
ing. If you take the ultimate aim of process tracing to be to identify the start–end
causal relationship between factor A and factor E, then:
(Criterion Four — Version A) A study does not count as process tracing if
it requires unit homogeneity for the starting factor A and the outcome E,
that is, the existence of a largish population of cases for which there is a
single mathematical function that describes the propensities governing E,
given variation in A and some other variables.
In contrast, if you take the ultimate aim of process tracing to be to identify
intermediate relationships in a causal chain, the suggestion is:
(Criterion Four — Version B) A study does not count as process tracing if
it requires unit homogeneity for any of the intermediate links in the chain,
that is, the existence of a largish population of cases for which there is a single
mathematical function that describes the propensities governing factorD, for
example, given variation in C and some other variables.
To understand the difference between these two versions of Criterion Four,
imagine a researcher who does the following. She examines a sample of 20 civil
wars post 1990, and uses econometric methods to show that C caused D for civil
wars post 1990; she next uses another sample of 20 civil wars in Central America,
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and uses econometric methods to show that D caused E for civil wars in Central
America. On this basis, she argues that C caused E in civil wars in Central Amer-
ica post 1990. In this case, she has not assumed that the relationship between
C to E is homogeneous across a largish population of cases, because there are
only a handful of cases that are Central American civil wars post 1990. So this
researcher has not violated version A of Criterion Four, although she has violated
version B.
Criterion Four also distinguishes process tracing from those quantitative techniques—
developed in psychology and imported into political science—that are labelled in-
terchangeably as “mediation analysis” or “path analysis” or ”structural equation
modeling” (Mackinnon 2007; Tarka 2018).16 Criterion Four also distinguishes
process tracing from more recent quantitative innovations in political science that
build on these older mediation-analysis techniques (Imai, Keele, and Tingley
2010; Imai et al. 2011). These techniques are all forms analyzing intermedi-
ate links in causal chains, but they do not count as process tracing, according to
Criterion Four.
6 Unhelpful Restrictions on Process Tracing
Why have I not suggested the following additional criterion? one might ask.
Namely: a study does not count as process tracing study if it needs any feature
of the case in question to resemble any other case. This criterion seems to me
unhelpfully restrictive. For example, many process tracers make assumptions that
the agents they are studying behave in familiar ways. A process tracer might as-
sume that agents will usually tend to hide information that casts them in a good
light but be reluctant to volunteer information that casts them in a bad light. As a
result a process tracer might credit negative confessions from her informants more
strongly than she does positive boasting. But the process tracer’s warrant for doing
this is that she knows that the informants she is talking to is in this respect similar
to most of the other people the process tracer has come to know in life. Therefore,
I suggest, it is far too restrictive to debar process tracing from relying on any form
of resemblance between her case and other cases.17 (In contrast, Criterion Four
debars process tracing from relying on a particular form of resemblance, namely
unit homogeneity, but this leaves open the possibility that process tracing studies
might rely on other forms of resemblance.)
16This is not to be confused with structural equation modelling within economics. SEM in
economics tend to be based on systems of simultaneous equations, and tend not to model latent
(unobserved) variables other than of course the error term.
17See Crasnow (2012) for a distinct argument to a similar conclusion.
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For precisely the same reason, I reject the following criterion: (F2) a study does
not count as a process tracing study if it relies on evidence from other cases. After
all, my process tracer in the above example is relying on evidence about other peo-
ple (people not within her case) to support her conclusions. (Sometimes criterion
F2 is endorsed more or less explicitly: process tracing is the use of “observational
within-case empirical material left by the workings of a causal mechanism within
an actual case to make inferences about the existence of a mechanism in a case”
(Beach 2017). Other times criterion F2 is heavily hinted at.18 )
Why have I not suggested the following additional criterion? one might ask.
Namely: (F3) a study does not count as a process tracing study if it needs the prob-
ability distribution of some variable to take a particular form. Again, this criterion
seems to me unhelpfully restrictive. As I’ve already noted, some process tracers
like to use proportions as evidence—for example, the proportion of women who
fought in the militias in El Salvador. But often to measure these proportions one
will have to draw sample from a wider population: there are simply too many
members of the militia to count them all. But the moment one seeks to use this
sample to measure the proportion in a wider population, one will need to make
probabilistic assumptions about one’s sampling method, if only implicitly and in-
formally.
This also highlights why I think is not strictly true that process tracing cannot
use statistical methods, as criterion F4 says. This is contrary to what Mahoney
(2004) and George andMckeown (1985) claim. For example, Wood’s study would
still be an exemplary process tracing study, even if she had used formal statistical
methods to establish the proportion of women who fought in the militias.
Why have I not suggested the following additional criterion? Namely: (F5) a
study does not count as a process tracing study if its results can be generalized. F5
is false because it says that (having used process tracing to establish the causes of
a given civil war) one is never licensed to use this as evidence that the same causes
are operating in another civil war. Whether or not one is licensed to extrapolate
from one civil war to a second one depends primarily on one’s knowledge of how
similar these wars are, not on the methods one used to study the first war. Indeed,
many process tracers explicitly say that process tracing often tries to generalize or
extrapolate. As Hall (2003, 395) puts it, process tracing “is an effort to elaborate
and assess the validity of theories capable of explaining a broad class of events or
outcomes. It seeks generalizations that are both more simple and more portable
than those at which historians typically aim.” “As regards the ambition to go
beyond the single case, this involves attempts to identify which mechanisms are
systematic and non-systematic in the specific case study” (Beach and Pedersen
18See Bennett and Elman (2006) and Beach and Pedersen (2016) and Mahoney (2010) and
Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) for just some examples.
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2016, 310).
In sum, F1 to F5 place unhelpful restrictions on what can count as a process
tracing study.
7 The Elusive Nature of Process Tracing
Recall criterion Criterion Four Version B: process tracing studies do not test in-
termediate causal hypotheses by methods that assume unit homogeneity, for ex-
ample by standard quantitative methods. This immediately raises the question:
if an intermediate causal hypothesis is not to be tested via standard quantitative
methods, then how else is it to be tested?
To explore this issue, this section will examine some further criteria for what
counts as process tracing. I will dismiss these putative criteria as empty: they do
not offer any substantive, additional constraints over and above Criteria One to
Four.
The first putative criterion I have in mind is: (E1) a study only counts as
a process tracing study if relies solely on “causal process observations” (Brady
2010). But what are causal process observations supposed to be, one might ask?
A promising preliminary clarification is to interpret criterion E1 as follows: (E1*)
a study only counts as a process tracing study if it uses “diagnostic evidence” to
uncover the mechanism under examination. This criterion is offered by Collier
(2011a) and Collier (2011b) among others. But what might it mean to say of some
evidence that it is “diagnostic evidence” for some hypothesis? On one reading,
all evidence for a given hypothesis is diagnostic evidence. In this case E1 just be-
comes Criterion One and Criterion Two, the idea that process tracing uncovers
mechanisms. On another reading, evidence counts as diagnostic evidence for an
hypothesis about a given case whenever the evidence itself is a fact about the very
same case. For example, the fact that Sophie’s skin is yellow is diagnostic evidence
that she has liver failure. In contrast, the fact that 90 percent of people with yellow
skin have liver failure is evidence that Sophie has liver failure; but it is not diag-
nostic evidence, one might say, because it is a fact about other people, not about
Sophie herself. (This seems to be the view of Beach (2017).) On this reading of
the meaning of “diagnostic evidence”, however, E1 just becomes the criterion F2
that I rejected in the last section.
Another interpretation of criterion E1 is to re-express it as follows: (E2) a study
only counts as a process tracing study if it uses pattern matching. See Mahoney
(1999), Mahoney (2004), Bennett and Elman (2006), and Beach (2017) andGoertz
and Mahoney (2012) for agreement. Pattern matching is the process of taking an
hypothesis—for example the hypothesis that Sophie has liver failure—and asking
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how well it can “account for” the patterns one sees in the data? How well can it
account for the fact that Sophie has yellow skin, for example?
The problem is that according to most philosophies of scientific inference all
scientific inference is pattern matching. Hypothetico-deductivism says that all sci-
entific inference is patternmatching, where “accounts for the patterns in the data”
is read as “the hypothesis entails the pattern as a matter of deductive logic”. Fal-
sificationism is just hypothetico-deductivism with the caveat that hypotheses are
never supported by the data, only falsified. Inference to the best explanation says
that all scientific inference is pattern matching, where “accounts for the patterns
in the data” is read as “the hypothesis, if it were true, would explain the patterns
in the data” (Lipton 1991). Bayesian epistemology says that all scientific inference
is pattern matching, where “accounts for the patterns in the data” is read as “the
scientist in question has a high degree of confidence that these patterns will be
occur, supposing that the hypothesis is true” (Howson and Urbach [1989] 2006).
So E2 does not put any restriction on what counts as process tracing. It fails
to tell us what is distinctive about process tracing as a method of causal inference.
(The only philosophy of scientific inference that seems difficult to fit with the pat-
tern matching idea is the frequentist philosophy of statistical inference. So my
best guess at interpreting E2 is as a round-about way of endorsing F4: a study
does not count as a process tracing study if it uses statistical methods. Or perhaps
it’s a roundabout way of endorsing the more defensible version of F1, namely my
Criterion Four.)
The third and final putative criterion I have in mind is the following: (E3) pro-
cess tracing can use a very wide variety of evidence. For example, Bennett and
Elman (2007, 183) says that process tracing uses “a wide variety of sources (often
including archived documents, contemporary news accounts, secondary histories,
biographies or memoirs, and interviews) with due attention to the potential mo-
tivated and informational biases of each source”. Fairfield and Charman (2017,
368) adds that it often uses “information about timing and sequencing, actors’
goals and intentions, and other aspects of causal mechanisms, as obtained from
a wide range of sources including interviews, archives, media records, and sec-
ondary literature.” All this is certainly true, but notice that it does not place any
restrictions on what counts as process tracing. There is not a single study for which
E3 suggests that that study doesn’t count as process tracing. Instead, E3 is a kind of
meta-criterion, which says that the criteria that we place on what counts as process
tracing should not be too restrictive. In particular, the criteria we place on process
tracing should allow process tracers to draw upon a wide variety of evidence. So,
as a criterion for defining process tracing, E3 is entirely non-restrictive.
Taking stock, I’ve argued in this section that criteria E1–E3 are empty: they do
not place any substantive constraints on what counts as process tracing, additional
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to Criteria One to Four.
8 Conclusion
I conclude that Criteria One to Four are the primary ways of defining process
tracing that are suggested by the present methodological literature. Note that I
offered two versions of these criteria. Version A is process tracing for the ultimate aim
of testing a start–end hypothesis. For a study to count as this type of process tracing:
It must identify the presence or absence of intermediate causal links between
some factor A and an outcome of interest E.
And, perhaps, it must describe each of these intermediate links in terms of
entities engaging in regular, well-understood activities.
It must ultimately aim to test the hypothesis that the starting factor in the
chain was a cause of the final outcome. And the means by which it pur-
sues this ultimate aim must be the following logical structure: (I) the overall
evidence e bears on hypothesis h only by first bearing on the intermediate
hypotheses; (II) for each intermediate hypothesis, there is a piece of evidence
e′ that bears on this intermediate hypothesis alone.
It must not require unit homogeneity for the starting factor A and the out-
come E, that is, the existence of a largish population of cases for which there
is a single mathematical function that describes the propensities governing
E, given variation in A and some other variables.
Version B is process tracing as an ultimate end in itself. For a study to count as this
type of process tracing:
It must identify the presence or absence of intermediate causal links between
some factor A and an outcome of interest E.
And, perhaps, it must describe each of these intermediate links in terms of
entities engaging in regular, well-understood activities.
Its ultimate aim must be this identification / description of the intermediate
links in a causal chain.
It must not require unit homogeneity for any of these intermediate links in
the chain, that is, the existence of a largish population of cases for which there
is a single mathematical function that describes the propensities governing
factor D, for example, given variation in C and some other variables.
As it stands, process tracing as an ultimate end in itself is under-theorized.
Given what I argued in Section 7, the methodological literature has barely begun
25
to answer the question: if an intermediate causal hypothesis is not to be tested
via methods that assume unit homogeneity, then how else is it to be tested? See
Runhardt (2015) for a similar worry. Some methodologists seemed to answer this
question by claiming that intermediate hypotheses could be directly observed to
be true (Brady 2010). But I think it’s fair to say that most methodologists now
reject this claim (Beck 2006; Crasnow 2012).
How then to proceed? In my view, what we urgently need is a taxonomy of
various different ways in which process tracers are supposedly able to test inter-
mediate causal hypotheses without relying on unit homogeneity. This taxonomy
would allow us to evaluate process tracers’ claims that process tracing is good at
eliminating rival causal hypotheses, that process tracing is not an inherently mi-
cro enterprise, and that process tracing really is its own method, distinct from
quantitative methods.
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